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STUDY PROJECT

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RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING --
THOUGHTS FOR TOMORROW'S ARMY

BY

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"Glasnost" and "perestroika" are whirlwinds of change which are beginning to impact upon the structuring of the Total Army for the twenty-first century. Their effects are permeating virtually every aspect of current Army thought. At no time since the writings of Major General Emory Upton in the 1800's has there been a greater influence for change in our fundamental concepts of how the Army should be structured.

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At the heart of the issue is the relative roles that the active and the reserve components should play as this nation moves beyond the Cold War. This paper uses Army training--specifically Reserve Component military intelligence training--as a vehicle to address the issue. The Army military intelligence (MI) community with its Reserve Component MI slice represents a microcosm of the Total Army. Much of what is relevant to specific MI issues is also relevant to the Army as a whole.

The paper examines a number of commonly-held beliefs about the Army (paradigms) as they relate to military intelligence in the reserves. Nineteen specific recommendations to improve Reserve Component military intelligence training are presented, with accompanying rationale. Finally, conclusions are inferred as to the best transition to a less costly force structure which will not emasculate the role of the military.

The paper concludes that current efforts to hold the line by retaining the largest possible Active Component are, ultimately, self-defeating. If we are to provide for a capability to fight a protracted war at the high end of the conflict spectrum, a greater investment in the capability of the reserve components is necessary.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING--
THOUGHTS FOR TOMORROW'S ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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DATE: 10 March 1990   PAGES: 67   CLASSIFICATION: Unclas

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RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

HOW DID WE GET HERE FROM THERE?

> The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings.... Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have been pressed....
>
> --General Omar Bradley[1]

General Bradley's observations of events which occurred nearly a half-century ago contain two elements which are worth remembering today. First, intelligence training was long overlooked prior to the outset of World War II, with disastrous results. Secondly, reserve intelligence soldiers acquitted themselves well during the war because of their unique qualifications.

Military intelligence today is no longer quite the stepchild it once was. It is now a branch equal in stature with the other combat support functions of the Army.

Likewise, the Total Army concept has gone a long way toward breaking down barriers and biases between the Regular Army and the citizen-soldier reservist.

Within this overall framework of support, however, much work needs to be done. One needn't probe too long before vestiges of old attitudes and biases become apparent. Old ideas die hard, and the Army, being one of our country's most conservative institutions, has its share of old ideas.

This paper attempts to pull General Bradley's two essential points--intelligence training and the reserves--together in the context of the Total Army of 1990. In a sense it is a status report of where we have come since World War II, what has changed, what is currently working well and what remains to be changed. More importantly, recommendations and observations are offered which may assist in helping assimilate the Reserve Components, the Active Component and the military intelligence (MI) community more fully into the Total Army. Finally, this paper attempts to identify ways to improve specific intelligence training and effectiveness in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Many of the thoughts expressed in this study are controversial. They are intended to be provocative. It is hoped they are not biased. The author spent exactly half of a 26-year military career in the regular Army and half in the United States Army Reserve.

"OUR GUEST SPEAKER WELCOMES CONTRASTING POINTS OF VIEW."

This effort represents the viewpoint of a soldier who has seen it from both sides.

It is impossible to address reserve component military intelligence (RC MI) training comprehensively without trespassing into the domains of personnel, logistics, strategy, and even constitutional fundamentals. In all of these areas there is relevancy to RC MI training, no matter how wide-ranging the discussion may sound. Because the discussion crosses the boundaries among the Army components, several conventions of terminology require explanation. In this paper the term Active Component (AC) refers to the full-time Regular Army. The term Reserve Component (RC) refers to the National Guard (NG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) simultaneously. The word 'Reserves' or 'Reserve' refers to the USAR when the word is capitalized. When not capitalized, the two words are used to denote the Guard and the Reserves together and are used interchangeably with the acronym, RC.

The Army's RC MI training has come a long way since World War II. The fact that we've gotten here from there is a fine accomplishment. Much has been done, and done well. The reserves and military intelligence still have far to go and, like General Bradley's dogface soldiers of World War II, the march must be completed, one step at a time.

ENDNOTES

1.   Stephen C. Conrad, LTC; <u>The History of Military Intelligence</u>, p. 7.

CHAPTER II

ANOTHER LOOK AT OLD PARADIGMS

IF YOU SHAKE THE TREE OF COMMONLY-HELD BELIEFS, YOU CAN EXPECT SOME ROTTEN FRUIT TO FALL

We all look at the world through our own personal reference system, or set of paradigms. What each of us perceives as "right" is colored by that system. The AC reference system provides a different perspective from the RC system, which in turn may be different altogether from a completely civilian outlook. No one's frame of reference is 100 percent accurate. For one to presume otherwise would be the height of arrogance.

A few old Army paradigms persist today, tolerated and perhaps venerated like an old uncle, whose mossy pronouncements on life and the state of the world are accorded respect (if not belief) befitting his age and status. A buzzword or a theme or a clever technique can also become so much a part of Army thinking (where would we be without "robustness" in the Army today?) that it is unconsciously accepted as gospel long after it has lost its relevance.

From time to time, it is worthwhile to take a new look at attitudes and truisms which have become a part of Army

thinking. A few of them have applicability to RC training in general , and to MI training in particular.

A FEW COMMONLY-HELD BELIEFS

"The complex world environment...h(as) removed the time buffer the United States previously enjoyed that allowed it to mobilize and train...."[2] Recently, government experts and press reports have seriously challenged the validity of this statement from FM 25-100. A consensus judgement of the JCS, CIA and DIA refutes the decade-long belief that the U.S. will have only 10-14 days to respond in the event of a war in Europe. Rather than having no time buffer, we now have a time buffer which is actually longer than the Nixon administration's estimate of 30 days advance warning. In the most likely circumstances it is now believed that the U.S. would have from 33 to 44 days of warning time. It is plausible that time would be increased to as much as six months under certain circumstances.[3]

Coupled with the probability of longer warning time is CIA Director William H. Webster's assessment that Soviet military strength and capabilities in Europe and around the world have declined.[4] This means that RC MI training needs to be re-looked. Some of the imperatives of FM 25-100 and other training doctrine today are no longer as valid as they were during the Cold War. There may be a better way.

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"Reserve Components Must Equal Active Components." This theme and several variants have abounded since King Henry II's Assize of Arms in 1181 required freemen to arm, periodically train, and be ready for the king's call to militia service. In the United States, Brevet Major General Emory Upton's disdain and contempt for the American citizen-soldier was well known. During this century, the perception of much Regular Army corporate thought about the reserves has been colored by the bias in Upton's writings.[5]

The result has been an historical tension, ameliorated, but by no means eliminated by today's "Total Army" concept. With the AC controlling the administration (and the purse strings) of all components of the Army, the RC has been required to dance to the piper's tune. The AC has required the RC to perform to AC rules.

While no one seriously argues the merit of having at least a small professional Regular Army, Uptonian thinkers would be well-advised to remember one fact: the United States has never won a war by the use of the Active Component alone or even by relying on the AC for the majority of her forces. Chart 1 illustrates the high proportion of USAR to active MI units.[6] Dr. Russell F. Weigley, in his several interesting books, examines the points of this historical friction in much more detail than

is necessary in this paper, but vestiges of this friction
remain today, even under the cloak of the Total Army
concept.

Army Military Intelligence Capability

CHART 1

Several corollaries and unstated assumptions to the "RC
must equal AC" mindset bear re-examining. First, there is a
widespread perception that the RC must train the way the AC
trains. That is an impossibility. The RC soldier receives
only 38 training days a year in discontinuous chunks of time
which are normally no more than two days long. Training
devices, simulators and even equipment are often quite

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different (and inferior) to that which is available to the AC. It is true that benefit can be gained by standardizing procedures and management systems with the AC, but the opportunities are limited. Consider Combat Electronics Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) units (Chart 1). Over 30 percent are found within the reserve structure of the Army. Innovation, not standardization must be the watchword for training CEWI units, since the AC can offer limited and mainly system-specific standardization guidelines.

A second assumption is that unit networking within the RC is the same as in the AC; in other words that the interaction and functioning of the chain of command is the same. This is simply not so. First, reserve unit members' homes are dispersed over a wide geographic area instead of being centrally located at an Army post and nearby surrounding towns. It is common for a reservist to travel 50 to 100 miles one way to attend drill. Commutes of 500 or more miles are not unheard of. As a result, staff meetings and daily one-on-one discussions are not as easy to accomplish as on a regular Army post. On the other hand, unit members may be largely in the employ of a major local corporation where they can perform routine unit coordination while on their civilian jobs. The informality bred in a civilian work environment often spills over into an informal, seemingly route-step reserve unit, with officers

and enlisted men on a first-name basis. This is anathema to many AC commanders, yet these reserve units can be surprisingly effective.

Reserve unit headquarters are also often widely dispersed, particularly where MI units are involved. Some MI detachments must report directly to four or more different command headquarters, each hundreds of miles away. Company to battalion, and battalion to brigade staff actions have to be mailed or telephoned. The luxury of person-to-person coordination between units is rare. Staffing which could be accomplished in the AC environment by a walk across post must be sent by mail. Often it cannot be acted upon for days or weeks, until the next unit drill.

This leads to a third perception, and that is that the AC should "drive the train"--that the AC should have the final say in matters of internal Total Army policy. Who says? Certainly not the Constitution of the United States. Constitutionally, the Army and the militia are separate and distinct entities with common control exercised only by the Commander-in-Chief.

An Active Component corps senior staff officer recently stated that a major training detractor within his corps is the commitment of AC troops to support RC two-week annual training. Yet the huge commitment of the same AC troops to support National Training Center (NTC) training of AC

brigades is not considered a detractor. It is sobering to note that over 53 per cent of that same corps' wartime fighting strength will be furnished by the very reserve components that are now considered a detractor. With such attitudes displayed by senior Army leaders, it is little wonder that reservists occasionally think they are being pushed to the back of the training bus.

There is sense in the argument that it is logical and convenient for the AC to have the lead responsibility in Army training matters. But responsibility also connotes stewardship. If the AC is to provide true stewardship, it must treat the RC as an equally vital component. This will balance the Uptonian concept of the warrior mentality with the citizen-soldier's vigorous respect for democratic national aims.

"You've got to go Where the Army Tells You to Go." Career soldiers are expected to accept assignment to any unit at any time anywhere in the world. For compensation they receive housing, medical care, subsistence, family assistance, and the knowledge they will have a steady job waiting at the other end.

Many reservists don't think that way because they must operate under a different social structure. None of the significant job perks mentioned above apply to the part-time

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reservist. If job exigencies or assignments force the reservist to relocate, all the costs may have to be borne by him and his family. If his civilian job takes him to a new city or state, there is no guarantee that there will be a reserve job waiting when he gets there. In the event that a part-time reservist would consider moving because of a new military assignment, there is no guarantee of a civilian job awaiting at the new location. The bottom line is turbulence, especially relocation or reassignment in the reserves is a special problem. Often a soldier will drop out of the reserve program if he is reassigned. Training, then, becomes a special challenge.

"Callup of the Reserves is Difficult or Bad--An Action to be Avoided." The Army is still smarting from adverse public opinion during Vietnam. Certainly there is reluctance to press for a callup of the reserves during any national crisis. Today a wave of self-congratulatory euphoria over operation JUST CAUSE in Panama is sweeping Army circles. Much of it is justified. But the down side of JUST CAUSE and other recent national emergencies is that Army Reservists have not been called into active duty. Two points must be made in the spirit of "lessons learned."

First, if our national objectives are valid, they should bear the test of public scrutiny. More frequent and

liberal mobilization of reserve units places these national objectives squarely under the spotlight of public scrutiny and opinion. The public becomes personally involved. In this way, the Army can hedge against the possibility of a breakdown of support as happened in Vietnam.

The second point, and one more directly related to RC training, is that the Army is supposed to be a One Army team. Doctrine states under what conditions units should be deployed. Some of those units are combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units which are only found in the RC. Yet, the Army does not use them. This paradox will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

"The Skill Qualification Test (SQT) is Inviolate," or, "Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) Equals Proficiency."

This problem exists in the AC as well as the RC. The net impact, however is greater in the RC. The availability of time for training and lack of relevancy are especially significant. Many RC soldiers are required to spend valuable training time preparing for skill qualification tests which (other than the common tasks portion) have less relevancy to reserve jobs than to most active duty jobs.

For example, reservists are engaged in the scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) field of small arms ordnance analysis. As currently written, SQT's for their MOS (96B) cover no aspect of their technical skills. It is therefore possible for a soldier to be MOS qualified and yet incapable of performing his actual technical intelligence job. On the other hand, Kalashnikov himself could not qualify or be assigned as an S&TI analyst in the U.S. Army despite his technical credentials. He would have to pass the 96B Intelligence Analyst SQT.

The United States General Accounting Office has recognized that in the Army, MOS qualification does not necessarily mean MOS proficiency. The GAO considered the problem to be of such seriousness that the issue was recently raised in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services.[7] The Army is considering solutions such as going to a tailored SQT where the unit commander will mark up the SQT to use only questions that apply to his soldiers' duty jobs.[8] This approach treats only half the problem, for it presumes that there are questions already in the SQT to permit the soldier to be tested. As alluded to earlier, intelligence analysts in the S&TI field do not have sufficient SQT questions to measure their duty qualification. Some non MOS-producing courses are more appropriate. In the above example, soldier attendance at

the non MOS-producing Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analyst Introductory Course (STIAIC) for DoD civilian employees would be more germane than anything TRADOC has to offer.

"Clearances are Essential, Security Requirements are Unwaiverable." With the exception of the requirement to protect sources and methods, virtually none of today's routine intelligence data could be reasonably considered to significantly jeopardize the national security of the United States if it were released to the open press. For example, the publication Soviet Military Power is an official U.S. Government unclassified anthology which is available for purchase by anyone through the United States Government Printing Office.[9] Yet identical or similar material is often given a high security classification and filed in relatively inaccessible secure storage. A bureaucratic and cumbersome system of administering security clearances results in widespread inefficiencies ranging from long lead times for background investigations to significant dilution of training effort and training efficiency.

This issue is larger than the Army, for it applies throughout the Department of Defense and the U.S. Government. We overclassify. One example of the extreme to which this is carried is the classified telephone directory

of a major U.S. Government agency which has a map of the Washington, D.C. Metro line. The map is classified SECRET. There are no national secrets on the map--in fact, a more detailed map is available for two dollars and change at any Washington book store.

Overclassification affects the RC MI unit directly and indirectly. Overly secure facilities may be required to store documents. Sometimes the nearest secure facility is located so far away that its use would be impractical. MI units performing work requiring civilian expertise may be hampered by overclassified photos, documents or equipment. Coordination with these civilian experts is sometimes severely restricted. There are better ways to accomplish investigations and adjudications so that months of potential training time are not wasted pending assignment of new members. We are using a low-tech approach. We also need to get out of the mindset that knowledge is power and that status comes with having more security clearances.

"Recruit Locally to Fill." FAX, teleconferencing, electronic mail, centralized training facilities and travel capabilities are now coming of age. It no longer makes sense to recruit only locally to fill MI positions. High skill, low density MOS's are particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties imposed by local recruiting. Properly

qualified soldiers may reside thousands of miles away from a unit, yet they may satisfactorily perform valid intelligence functions.

The reality remains with us. Recruiters are prohibited from recruiting reservists outside a 100-mile radius.[10] Defense budget cuts for the foreseeable future will mandate that the RC look hard at ways to cut costs. The Army has often gone to great expense training soldiers for a particular MOS. Much of this expense can be recouped if the RC unit has the latitude to select from properly qualified soldiers who live outside the local area.

"Training is the Army's Top Priority."[11] Whatever happened to combat readiness as a priority? It could be argued that readiness or mission proficiency is the higher goal and that training is simply one means to that end. Some in the Army feel that this is an issue of semantics, but there is an important distinction. Some RC MI units devote the majority of drill time to actual intelligence production, not to training per se. The resulting contribution is widely acknowledged to benefit not only the Army, but the entire DoD intelligence community. Strategic MI detachments, for example, were created because of the pre-existing expertise of the soldiers that join the detachments. In such units,

training has a secondary (albeit important) role. Otherwise, it would be a case of the tail wagging the dog.

"Army Collaboration with Civilian Agencies and Industry is Ethically and Morally Bad." Well, collaboration may be bad, but cooperation certainly is good. The problem is that too many people equate the two, and cooperation suffers. A little known and even less used Army Regulation, AR 140-1,[12] has enabled a few small units to legally and productively enjoy the support of civilian agencies and industries. Through a simple affiliation agreement, virtually any unit, can participate, but the concept has special relevance to RC MI units. The concept deserves more attention, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

"Administration Will Get You." This is a problem which has been around as long as warfare. Everybody talks about it, and it certainly is not unique to the RC. Yet, some RC units get by nicely with no assigned or authorized administrative support. Excessive administrative demands are simply not a problem. A careful scrutiny of the way these RC MI units cope with their situation may provide some insights into the systemic administrative burdens of the Total Army.

One key appears to lie with the willingness of the commander to exercise his command perogatives. These perogatives usually include a willingness to refuse needlessly imposed requirements from higher headquarters. One Army Circular called this approach "selective disobedience".[13] Whatever the term used, it becomes an essential tactic for unit survival.

"The Commander is Responsible for All His Unit Does or Fails to Do." Well, almost.

"The Commander is Responsible for All His Unit Does or Fails to Do." Well, almost. Except for assigning unit members, determining MOSQ, grooming his own replacement or having a key say in the process, having authority to obligate funds, et cetera. The point is, many traditional command perogatives have been slowly transferred to the purview of various boards, committees, councils, and special staff functions. By taking the "corporate approach" to command and training, training may have lost some of its focus and direction.

This is certainly a problem common to the AC--it is not unique to the RC. But the trend toward corporateness is subtilely perverse for the RC. It provides an easy way to avoid facing up to a problem directly. It develops bureaucrats rather than innovators. It perpetuates the image of the RC as ineffectual, bungling and without purpose.

SUMMARY

The foregoing is intended to highlight some systemic shortcomings within the Army today which can impact RC MI training. Most of the problems and commonly-held beliefs have wider application than just RC MI training. The recommendations which follow, or any RC MI training improvement for that matter, should be addressed in the context of these commonly-held beliefs.

ENDNOTES

2. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100, p. i (hereafter referred to as "FM 25-100").

3. Patrick E. Tyler and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Study Finds NATO War Plans Outdated", Washington Post, 29 November 1989, p. A1.

4. Patrick E. Tyler, "CIA's Webster Says Soviet Military Threat Declining", Washington Post, 24 January 1990, p. A4.

5. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. v - vi.

6. William F. Ward, MG. Posture of the United States Army Reserve FY 89, p. D-20.

7. Richard A. Davis, Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy. p. 7.

8. Interview with James Vaitkunas, LTC, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 18 January 1990.

9. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989.

10. Davis, Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy, p. 8.

11. FM 25-100, p. ii.

12. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 140-1, (hereafter referred to as "AR 140-1").

13. U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Circular 350-88-XX, (draft). p. 2-3 (hereafter referred to as "DA Cir 350-88-XX").

"YOU'RE IN THEATER INTELLIGENCE? HOW NICE.
AND WHEN WILL YOUR SHOW BE COMING TO NEW YORK?"

CHAPTER III

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

IT YOU'RE DANCING CLOSE, SOME TOES WILL GET STEPPED ON

No one will seriously argue that the RC training environment is exactly like that of the AC. Accepting this fact, one has to conclude that some differences will exist in ways to go about the business of training. What's at issue is the degree or extent of change.

It appears that the task of Army training would be well served if a generic overall Army model were developed to address Component 1 (Active), Component 2 (National Guard), and Component 3 (Army Reserve) units. That is being done.[14] There is no other realistic alternative. But it would be a mistake to require a lock-step, rigid adherence to one system. Variables exist among the components, and that accounts for their strengths--not simply their weaknesses. Properly managed, most perceived weaknesses of the RC can be turned into strengths. The AC is slowly beginning to recognize this. And while some toes may get stepped on, the following recommendations are advanced in the spirit of allowing the RC strengths to shine through. It's all part of the dance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Decentralize Approval Authority to the Unit Commander
for All Unit-Specific Decisions. Over-centralization is a
systemic problem which is just as applicable to the AC as it
is to the RC. It's an insidious problem, too, since several
of the recommendations in this study in fact involve
centralization. But the push must be downward to the units
to make their own decisions, especially with the widely
varying nature of military intelligence. As a rule,
centralization of functions has merit only when a function
is beyond the capability of the unit. This is one of the
greatest advantages the United States Army enjoys over the
Soviet Army--the ability to exercise initiative through
decentralized command authority.

Many unit functions are retained at MUSARC, CONUSA, and
even FORSCOM level,[15] when they really could be made one or
more levels lower in the command chain. Examples are:
training tasks and standards, qualification testing and
evaluation, and the level of authority needed to assign MI
soldiers to units.

The essence of the examples involving training and
qualification evaluation was being considered in DA Circular
350-88-XX, which stated:

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> Excessive training guidance or training
> requirements creates an environment in which the
> RC leader may be compelled to consider selective
> disobedience simply because limited time and
> resources do not allow all requirements to be met
> and followed.[16]

Unfortunately the draft DA Circular remained in effect only seven months, when it was superceded by the RC Training and Development Action Plan (RC TDAP) and the powerful description of one of the Army's major management problems was stricken from the record. That quote should be engraved on a plaque on the desk of every staff officer at MACOM level or higher.

The level of MI assignment authority, while nominally a personnel issue, is a training matter as well. It is not unusual for interested and qualified soldiers to wait for eight months to a year before getting assigned to an MI reserve unit. This is not good. Most MI skills are perishable, and this does not foster a good training environment. In some cases, four distinct higher levels of command must approve an assignment action. A cagey commander can occasionally bypass some of this layering or have simultaneous approval granted, but it is risky. If he makes a mistake or does not consider every issue, the request for assignment may be returned without action. Any time saved is then lost.

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It seems the RC community could take a lesson from the hiring practices of American industry. Virtually all American businesses (including defense contractors with classified facilities) are capable of screening and hiring applicants from off the street within a couple of weeks. An important technique which is used is the "conditional hire". What really should preclude the unit commander from assigning soldiers on that basis? If the commander is to be a commander in fact and not in name only, he will be fully responsible and accountable to higher authority for his actions. TRADOC or FORSCOM or the individual Army headquarters may have a problem with delegating such authority in blanket fashion but one could maintain that that authority should never have been taken from the unit commander in the first place. It is the essence of command, but that is a separate issue.

There may be real and justifiable concerns about the qualifications and objectivity of some commanders. If that is the case, limited approval authority could be granted to specific commanders based upon that commander having met the appropriate level (MEL 1, MEL 2) of education.

Grant Equivalency Training to Reservists Whose Civilian Jobs Relate to Their Reserve Job. There are a remarkably large number of civilian professions which are heavy in skills

required in military intelligence. Virtually all of the earth and topographic sciences, all engineering fields, and a number of the social and service professions such as geography, linguistics, and law enforcement relate to one or more MI military occupational specialties. The granting of equivalency training could apply toward MOS credit or toward temporary detailing to a new MI MOS. In all cases, granting equivalency training credit would be a subjective call, but it can be done. Colleges and universities do it all the time when they transfer course credits for new students. It is possible to develop a matrix which would guide this process toward granting an MI MOS. The best approach, however, might be to leave each decision a subjective call made by the commander. As with all command decisions, they are subject to review by higher command, so a system of checks and balances is already in place. If the granting commander has met appropriate MEL level requirements himself, decisions should be balanced and generally consistent with Total Army policy.

More liberal use of detailing into MI units has potential for officers and enlisted alike. This management technique was more widespread in the past than it is today. There were a number of abuses to the system which gave rise to this being called the "good old boy" system. The reserves have improved significantly since the 1970's when

abuses were more common. Perhaps it would be wise to have another look at the detailing policy. Properly used, it could enhance the RC MI training posture. Detailing, by definition, is temporary and not permanent. It could be revoked any time due to abuse, performance, reassignment, or other reasons.

Reduce or Eliminate Security Clearance Levels Required for Assignment to a Unit. This is an Army security policy issue. The sticking point insofar as RC MI units are concerned is that clearances must be granted prior to a soldier's accession into most units. Most of the required security investigations are special background investigations (SBI). It takes from eight to twelve months normally for an SBI to be processed, from the time it is initiated by the gaining commander until it is adjudicated. The actual investigation (interviews and write-up) portion by the Defense Investigative Service normally takes only a couple of months.[17] The rest of the time is spent awaiting adjudication or in other administrative preparation. It is a significant RC MI training detractor if the commander must hold a key position open while he awaits his nominee's assignment to be approved.

The job can be done quicker. A step in this direction has been allowing a reservist to be conditionally assigned

if he has a completed favorable clearance of SECRET. The conditional assignment is still made at CONUSA level, however, which creates some delay. Also, if the reservist has never had a clearance, the process will still take nearly as long as performing a full SBI.

Systemic improvements in the investigative process can be achieved. Relatively thorough credit checks are performed by computer in less than 30 minutes within the civilian sector. The local servicing DIS could surely grant a conditional approval within a few days. Then, the soldier could be conditionally assigned by the immediate gaining commander for pay and training. There is normally no requirement to place a new enlistee in a sensitive job anyway. The formal SBI action could be in process all during the time the soldier is "training up."

Even such a prestigious and security sensitive institution as the United States Army War College has no significant problem maintaining a mix of highly cleared and uncleared students. At any given time, sensitive national issues are discussed while nearby in the same building are literally dozens of uncleared personnel, many of whom are from foreign countries.

The immediate commander at the 0-5 level should be allowed the freedom to conditionally assign soldiers if it would benefit the unit's training posture. He could then

allocate training and tasking based upon the security requirements of his unit. Most RC MI soldiers do not work in the classified mode one hundred percent of the time. Uncleared soldiers can be productive, particularly when a vigorous security reduction program is employed. As mentioned in Chapter II, the plethora of over-classified photos, equipment and documents is a training detractor. If the Army were to eliminate the detractor, it would also open the door to assigning qualified and lower-cleared personnel,thereby improving unit fill rates and overall unit mission capabilities.

Pay Individual Mobilization Augmentees. For the past three years the United States Army Reserve has maintained a strength of about 320,000 soldiers. This comprises seven percent of the combat manpower and thirty-three percent of the support contribution to the Total Army force structure. Yet the USAR received only slightly more than four percent of the Total Army budget. This is a cost-effective use of funds. But part of the reason is that a lot of drilling reservists have been working for free. And that needs to be changed.

The unpaid drilling reservists are mainly Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). Currently, there are slightly more than 14,000 IMA's. All are subject to the

President's 200,000 man callup authority and all must report without delay and be immediately productive with little or no post-mobilization training.[18] The program is almost equally divided between officer and enlisted; however soldiers below the rank of E-5 cannot participate. Because of their highly specialized skills, a large number of IMA's are MI qualified and there is a continuing demand for their talents. The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) for example, has 1050 IMA position requirements.[19]

All IMA's may be required to complete up to 48 drill assemblies per year in an unpaid status. That equates to over four normal work-weeks--over a month a year--that these soldiers are expected to work for free. They are considered a part of the Army's trained manpower pool, yet the Army has seen fit not to compensate them for their effort. The overwhelming majority only see an Army paycheck at the end of their two-week Annual Training (AT) at their mobilization station.

A token bone has been tossed to the IMA reservists during the past year in the form of the Drilling IMA Program, but it is too small. The program will allow 10 percent of the IMA soldiers to get paid for 24 of their 48 Unit Training Assemblies (UTA). The program will add another 2.5 percent of IMA's each year for the next four years until it finally caps out with 20 percent of all

members getting half pay. The remaining 80 percent will continue to work for free--propelled, no doubt, by a sense of duty--or they will retire or drop out of the program.

Occasionally an IMA in the MI skill area cannot perform a home station project between AT periods. Local USAR MI units could assist (and be assisted) if the IMA could become attached to the unit for training during the year. Attachment would be at the discretion of the commander if the attachment would further his unit mission and if the unit could support the extra logistic and administrative burden which is entailed. It would be useful if the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) could poll IMA reservists to determine the extent of interest in this approach. Certainly not all IMA's, or even perhaps the majority, could make use of such a program. There may be enough interest, however, to make it worthwhile for a significant few.

Many units are overloaded with project work and the availability of experienced, willing assistants could be of significant help. As long as an attached IMA can perform a useful function, he should be allowed to be attached in a pay status. Also, there should be no arbitrary maximum limit of IMA's who could be attached per unit. That should be driven by the unit commander's assessment of the number he can support.

When one considers the overwhelmingly favorable return
on investment the Army receives for its reserve
contribution,there is no compelling argument for
continuation of the current work-for-no-pay policy. IMA's
who are performing validated Inactive Duty--Training (IDT)
projects or who are attending and drilling with a Troop
Program Unit (TPU) are entitled to an equitable allocation
of pay and allowances.

**Assign Real-World Intelligence Missions to Each USAR MI
Unit.** Lieutenant General Harold Soyster, director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was recently asked in
what ways his RC MI assets could best support his agency.
His unequivocal and immediate response was, "Assign them
real world intelligence missions." He felt the RC in DIA
could rapidly become proficient in their intelligence
functions if they were required to do real tasks.[20]

USAR MI units fall into four main categories; strategic
MI detachments, CEWI battalions, separate brigade/ACR MI
companies, and CI detachments. Each has the potential to
perform actual intelligence functions as part or all of its
training effort. Implementation of real-world scenarios has
been spotty. Most people readily agree that it is helpful,
but there is no organized and broadly implemented push to
make it happen.

Perhaps the model program to date upon which to draw is FORSCOM's Umbrella Architecture Implementation Concept Plan for strategic MI detachments.[21] Generally acknowledged to be a stable and effective program, MID(S) are required by regulation to devote at least 75 percent of drill time to actual intelligence production. Some MIDs are so competent that research and analysis in some technical fields is routinely handed over to them to perform instead of to the proponent Army Materiel Command (AMC) laboratory.

The FORSCOM Umbrella Plan is an acknowledgement of past successes of such projects and is an attempt to build upon the units' abilities to produce meaningful, valid intelligence. It is a continuing assessment of each unit's CAPSTONE alignment to improve guidance and to ensure work is accomplished only on validated Army and theater requirements.[22] A basic premise of the working group as it conducts its annual evaluation of the 59 MIDs Army-wide, is, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." To date, less than half a dozen MID(S) have had significant mission realignments.

A number of companies, CEWI battalions and CI detachments perform some type of currently useful intelligence function. The available literature is spotty, however; one normally hears about them by word of mouth. It would be useful to have a proponent point of contact for current intelligence missions at FORSCOM, OCAR and DCSINT.

One of the most fertile possible mission areas for real-time intelligence is with the war on drugs. Border surveillance is ideally suited to the missions of the CEWI battalions. Other units could be rotated into hot spots of the drug trade to assist the DEA and host countries in their efforts to identify, monitor and interdict the flow of drugs at key choke points. There appears to be ample opportunity to do intelligence and counterintelligence work without raising the posse comitatus issue.

A cautionary note, however. Depending on the real-world mission chosen, some tasking could be considered Live Environment Training (LET). The purpose of LET is to be a tool for better training, not to supplement an existing staff. If LET is not properly implemented, legal issues could arise.[23]

Before leaving this discussion of real-world intelligence and its applicability to RC MI training, it's appropriate to briefly examine two related topics--retention and motivation. There is an intuitive correlation between a good Army unit and the attitudes of its men. Retention and motivation are two of the most important indicators. If the men feel they have worth--if they think they're doing well, they'll stay in the Army. In the majority of cases, MID(S) soldiers wish to remain with their unit--and consequently with the USAR program. Often, they will remain in the unit

despite opportunities for more rapid promotion elsewhere.
It is not uncommon for an EM to remain in a unit knowing he
has zero opportunity for promotion even though vacancies
exist in other nearby units. That attitude as much as
anything, validates the concept of doing real-life
intelligence.

On-The-Job Training (OJT) Should be Given Credibility as a
Valid Training Technique. In the sixties and early 1970's
OJT was part and parcel of Army training. Since the mid-
1970's, the command and regulatory environment has
discouraged OJT as a desirable method of MOS qualification.
OJT now is the option of last resort. Few people in the
Army today, and virtually no one in the training field says
anything good about it.[24] The attitude is ubiquitous, but
the attitude is also false.

Virtually every industry or business in the United
States that operates a training program uses OJT. It is
just as important in the training of a machinist or a mill
operator as any formal course of instruction. Sales,
configuration control, program management, quality control
and a host of manufacturing skills are predominantly OJT-
oriented. If the rest of the world can use OJT effectively,
there is no compelling reason to summarily exclude it from

the unit commander's menu of training options for MOS qualification (MOSQ).

A number of MOS's (eg; 96B, 96D, 96F, 96R, 98G) are intensely system-specific or specialty-specific. A reservist can progress through an entire intelligence career without having the exposure (or the need) to perform all aspects of his MOS. The current requirement to be qualified across the board diffuses training time and focus, lowers relevancy, job satisfaction and, ultimately, retention. OJT can often be the preferred approach when considering these factors. In this regard, duty qualification should sometimes be given priority over MOS qualification.

A number of reservations about OJT can be addressed satisfactorily through a comprehensive yet flexible validation process. Regional Training Sites for Intelligence (RTS-I) can be tasked with part of their mission to provide evaluation teams to visit units requesting OJT. The RTS-I could tailor OJT programs appropriate to the unit and then monitor and evaluate the results. Satisfactory completion of an RTS-I developed OJT program would allow the award of the MOS. A number of other creative training solutions involving OJT could be devised which would complement, not detract from the Army's formal military schooling program. The biggest challenge is likely to be overcoming 15 years of institutional bias.

<u>Create a Centralized Management Cell at ARPERCEN to Place</u>
<u>all Available Qualified Soldiers into Matching Vacant Duty</u>
<u>Positions Without Geographic Constraint. As Part of This,</u>
<u>Centra.ize Military Intelligence Specialty Training Elements</u>
<u>(MISTE) and Expand its Training Program.</u> There seems to be
widespread top-level support to do something along these
lines. FORSCOM and Headquarters DA have developed point
papers which support similar management approaches.[25],[26]

Citing an estimated cost of initial skill training of
MOS 98G (SIGINT/EW Voice Intercept Linguist) of $128,000 per
man, FORSCOM noted that FY87 and 88 losses to the AC totaled
633 soldiers, or $46.8 million worth of training. Many of
these soldiers could be re-captured into RC MI units if the
system was more efficient.

FORSCOM has proposed to establish a management cell
under OPCON of ARPERCEN as mentioned above. Soldiers living
outside the geographic area of their assigned units will be
attached for pay and administration to ARPERCEN where they
may conduct team training at an RTS-I. These MI soldiers
would also attend AT with their units. The increased costs
associated with travel to RTS-Is and AT sites would be
offset by savings recouped from the high initial skill
training costs. The approach is a variant of the highly
successful MISTE program.

The MISTE program has suffered somewhat from ragged recruiting, training, managing and funding among the CONUSAs. Inter-CONUSA operations have also been difficult. Within DA a proposal is being floated to consolidate and replace the CONUSA MISTE programs in a move which is very similar to the one proposed by FORSCOM. An attractive element of the two approaches is that they would provide one-step service for MI soldiers for placement, pay, orders and records management.

As currently written the MISTE expansion concept is a bit restrictive, primarily because it specifies actual numbers of drills to be used by training type. If these specifications were to be written as a suggested guide with flexibility built in for the commander to tailor the program, the program would be more useful.

Make a Priority Effort to Recruit Prior Service Accessions and People Who Have Civilian Occupations Similar to Jobs in the Reserve Unit. This policy has traditionally and successfully been used by the United States Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps and the Army have had less success.[27]

A number of external factors impact upon effective RC training. Recruiting problems are certainly detriments to

training and to achieving required skill levels. Two categories of problems are worth noting.

First, a trained AC soldier may leave the Army because of expiration of his term of service (ETS) and remain inactive in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). He may be unable or unwilling to participate, or he may simply opt to transfer to another service such as the Navy or Air Force. In any case, his skills cannot be used by the reserve components. As an indicator of the magnitude of the problem, of the 633 AC losses in MOS 98G mentioned earlier, 143 (22.6%) joined Navy or Air Force programs or remained inactive in the IRR.

The second category of problem comprises the largest number of soldiers, and that is when soldiers join RC unit programs in a different MOS. In the above case for MOS 98G, 366 (57.8%) soldiers joined the RC in a different MOS. Of the total 633 soldier AC losses in the 98G MOS, only 124, or 19.6%, voluntarily joined the RC MI program in the MOS for which they had been trained.[28] (Chart 2)

AC TRANSITIONS
MOS 98G (FY 87 and 88)

RC 98G (19.6%)

INACTIVE (22.6%)

OTHER RC (57.8%)

CHART 2

More aggressive recruiting is certainly part of the
answer, but it is not the total answer. Part of the problem
is that when a soldier's ETS date arrives, no mechanism is
in place to allow him to be directly assigned into an RC
unit.[29] If a suitable mechanism were devised, it would be a
significant step in Total Army integration. The
recommendation above could be thought of as a bill payer,
not a cost producer. There would be some costs associated
with the approach, such as re-enlistment bonuses and

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maintaining a higher graded force, but such costs should be more than offset by the Army's retention of its training investment.

Use More Private Sector Training. Reservists may not be able to attend required skill-producing courses. Job constraints are a significant factor, despite the Soldier and Sailor Civil Relief Act and other legal recourse.

Often, however, local educational facilities or even the reservist's company of employment provide skill training which is MOS-related. Private sector training contracts can free up reservists' time which would not normally be available. A side benefit accrues because the civilian employer would see more relevancy and would consequently be more supportive of the reserve program. Incumbent upon the commander would be the requirement to justify training relevancy.

The biggest problem involving the use of more private sector training is not the availability of training, but in the development of an Army methodology which can accommodate non-standard training. The answer will have to incorporate flexibility, innovation and some manner of decentralization.

Enlist to a Unit. One could argue that this is already being done, but the concept here is to make the enlistment

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even more specific to the unit. USAR enlistees tend to remain with their units rather than transfer regularly, as with the AC. While the AC soldier must meet a training standard applicable to all AC units, the RC soldier does not.

This is not to say that the RC soldier should train to a different standard. The standards should be the same between the AC and RC. But the RC soldier will have fewer tasks to train for. Consequently the RC soldier can train more intensely to unit-specific requirements.

The enlistment contract could be negotiated to specific unit standards and requirements. During infrequent reassignments or transfer to another unit the soldier's term of enlistment would be re-negotiated.

Increase the local Recruiting Radius. DoD regulations which mandate a maximum recruiting radius of 100 miles are now obsolete. It may be best to not put a cap on the distance to which a soldier can be recruited for a unit. Today's transportation infrastructure in the United States easily allows for rapid travel to greater distances. And if unit-related work can be accomplished at home or at a local armory there is little need to require most reservists to attend every single drill. If the recruiting radius is expanded it may be presumed that would attract a higher

quality soldier. The available manpower pool would be
enlarged and it is likely that only the more motivated
soldiers will be willing to travel the greater distances.
The case could be made that a training cost avoidance would
occur. It would require some study, but it should be
feasible to increase T&L allowances to allow members
residing outside the local area (say, beyond 100 miles) to
be reimbursed for travel to IDT training. Excessive
distance is often a reason for a unit not being able to
recruit an otherwise highly qualified candidate. Distance
objections can often be overcome if there is a possibility
of reasonable reimbursement for travel.

Use the Presidential Callup Authority More Frequently to
Support Operational Missions, and Emphasize Unit Callups to
Active Duty--Not Individuals. The President may activate up
to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily for not
more than 90 days without declaring a national emergency (10
U.S.C. 673b). He can also extend this action for an
additional 90 days without Congressional approval if there
is sufficient reason. The activated force need not be the
full 200,000 men, and it may be used to support operational
missions such as occurred in Grenada and Panama.

It is significant that RC MI units were not called up
in either crisis. In fact, reservists were not incorporated

into operation JUST CAUSE planning at all. Only after the operation was underway was it decided that reservist civil affairs assistance was needed. A conscious decision was made at Army, DoD, or the Presidential level not to call up civil affairs units, however. Instead, individual volunteers were accepted from the units. The unit commander from the CAPSTONE CA unit assigned to SOUTHCOM was not even allowed into Panama because it was determined he did not have a "need to know." That logic is questionable. It was also counter-productive in several ways:

(1). It begged the issue of testing public opinion. The Army thus missed an opportunity to validate the extent of public support. The United States has national interests, goals, and strategy which are normally cogent and well-reasoned. Nevertheless, we sometimes involve ourselves in armed conflict without properly articulating them. This phenomenon occurred in Vietnam. The result for the Army in Vietnam was an erosion of public support which debilitated morale and effectiveness for years. The Abrams Doctrine recognized this, and combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units were made heavily reserve-oriented. It is in precisely this type of situation where the reserves come into their own. Current thinking in some Army circles is to bring some CS and CSS units back into the AC. This

contemplated action ignores one of the major lessons of the Vietnam War.

If contingency operations (such as JUST CAUSE) required some reserve callup the American public would become more heavily involved. Public support can be strong, vocal, and effective when it is for a good reason. On the other hand, the public is sophisticated enough to question military adventurism or specious dabbling into international affairs where the military ought not to be. This questioning process becomes sharply focused when a Hometown U.S.A. reserve unit is called up. This can only help the military, in the long run, because it will keep our military forces representative of the national will. It's insurance for the Army. It's always a good idea to get an early indication of the problems one is up against. That did not happen soon enough in Vietnam. It could have easily become the case in Panama.

(2). By not calling up reserve units, the Army provided no legal reason for employers to release their RC employees. This deprived the Army of use of additional skilled augmentation which was badly needed. Only four plausible reasons exist for not calling up RC units during the contingency operation in Panama: a) The Army felt RC individuals could do a better job than units, b) RC units couldn't perform the job, c) AC units were all that were

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required, or, d) Implementing a unit callup would have been too bothersome cr too unpopular or both.

Regarding the first reason listed, while the Army obviously chose the course of asking for individual RC volunteers with civil affairs skills, it is more likely that was done because that was the expedient thing to do. Otherwise there would be no rationale to even maintain units in the reserves or all units should be augmentation units to be used for individual fills.

If the Army felt that the RC could not perform its mission (reason (b)), then that issue should be addressed squarely and forthrightly. So far, nothing in the press indicates that the Army felt reservists couldn't handle the job.

If the AC felt that the RC was not needed and it could carry off the operation entirely by itself (reason (c)), then the AC is deluding itself and countermanding its own doctrine about the importance of CS and CSS units to the Army structure. If such reasoning was used, it was shallow thinking indeed. One only needs to assess the Army's admitted lack of HUMINT in Panama to come to the conclusion that the RC MI assets should have been considered long before the invasion. Considering the exceptionally long time spent planning and rehearsing for JUST CAUSE, why then could not RC MI units have been included in the force

allocation? Certainly the RC is capable of training for contingency plans.

The final (and most likely) reason--that it was too politically sensitive or too much trouble--is the weakest reason of all. At least the other reasons involved proactive decisions. The last reason involves a nondecision--an unwillingness to squarely face the issue. As events turned out, the Army received a lot of good press. If the operation had encountered more difficulties, the press would have soured quickly. On the other hand, if the public perceived themselves as supporting their hometown boys and events took a turn for the worse, it is likely that public pressure would moderate the immediate damage of any destructive cycle of bad press.

(3). The opportunity was lost to identify and eliminate soldiers who have little intention or ability to deploy with their units. The reserves unfortunately have in their midst a minority of individuals who have little intention of going to war once the call goes out. These people will happily draw their monthly paycheck, but will have a convenient excuse not to participate in a full-up mobilization. Unfortunately, they cannot all be identified until M-day. More frequent unit callups would identify the deadwood and allow the system to be flushed from time to time.

(4). By bringing in individual volunteers rather than units trained for the job, the stage was set for piecemeal commitment of RC assets in any future national emergency. This, really, is the most insidious reason of all. Just because it seemed to work in a successful operation, planners will want to use the same formula from now on. There has been historical concern within the RC MI community that unit members will be used as "fillers" for the AC with no regard for unit integrity. Operation JUST CAUSE certainly bore this out. JUST CAUSE was a small enough operation that little damage was done to the Total Army concept when the operation is viewed solely on its own merits. There is a great danger, however, that permanent harm was done to Active/Reserve Component interaction which will affect future protracted conflicts.

Increase Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) Emphasis on the Civilian Sponsored Unit Program. This program is a force multiplier and a cost saver that receives too little attention. The Civilian Sponsored Unit Program is an appropriate tool with which the RC MI commander can manage the organized employer relationship program required by the RC TDAP.[30] Most civilian organizations are unaware of the programs' existence. Yet a number of employer industries and organizations would be willing to participate out of a sense

of civic duty or the knowledge that a good image means good business. A list of potential sponsoring organizations for RC MI units is at the table.[31]

LISTING OF POTENTIAL CIVILIAN SPONSORS
FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MI UNITS

Chemical manufacturing companies
General contractors
Coast and Geodetic Survey agencies
Civil and governmental investigative agencies
Insurance companies
Petroleum industries
Electronic industries
Pharmaceutical industries
Colleges and universities
Communication and photographic companies
Aircraft manufacturers
Aircraft maintenance industries
Airline companies
Law enforcement agencies

TABLE

The advantage to training caused by such a sponsorship arrangement is significant. A sponsoring agency voluntarily commits itself to provide unit personnel fills insofar as possible, forming a ready-made recruiting pool. This practically assures that soldiers will be at least qualified in their duty MOS. Often the training will have been at the civilian company's expense.

The Army could provide greater incentives for a potential sponsoring agency to commit to sponsorship. Examples of incentives could be tax breaks, priorities for

government loans, and increased Independent Research and Development (IR&D) funding, to name a few. Legal avenues should be explored to determine what can and cannot be allowed by existing law. Statutory changes should be considered and enacted, perhaps spearheaded by the Reserve Officers Association (ROA).

Extend Tenure. In point of fact, this is the current practice and it seems to be working reasonably well. It does not appear to be official policy, and that is the reason for mentioning it in this study. Abuses to the system do occur, principally in the USAR schools where instructors have become homesteaders and have lost their grounding in practical professional skills. In troop units, extended assignments can be quite beneficial. Strategic MI detachment command tours of from four to six or more years are not unusual.

Certainly dead wood needs to be moved out of any unit, but it makes sense, for example, to keep a qualified commander if no qualified replacement is available to step in. In a broader sense across the RC manpower spectrum there is a need for more acceptance of the fact that career MI reservists (officer and enlisted) may be willing to stay in the same unit indefinitely. Unit bonding is so strong

that in many cases these individuals are willing to forego all chance of future promotion in order to remain.

Allow the Unit Commander to Maintain a Paid Enlisted managerial Overstrength Which is at Least Equivalent to the Number of Soldiers Who Cannot Attend AT Because of Other Training. This enlisted managerial overstrength would stabilize present for duty strength, enhance readiness, and use the full TOE/TDA capability of the unit to perform its mission. The management technique would be especially useful in the smaller RC MI detachments because the loss of even one man who cannot attend AT with the unit can mean a personnel strength degradation of more than ten percent. The current regulation authorizes an enlisted management overstrength of one in any grade. That often is not sufficient, particularly because of the exceptionally long lead times (up to a year) which can transpire before an individual is assigned.

Upgrade the School Quota System and Review POI's to Determine if Turnbacks are Really Necessary for Uncleared Students. "No shows" are a systemic problem throughout the TRADOC school system.[32] Oversubscription is less common, but that too, can create difficulty. Often a school does not know how many students to expect until the morning of

the first class. Simple management systems could be implemented which would predict attendance accuracy to nearly 100 per cent.

As a rule of thumb, a school should have enough information about each student to be able to get on the telephone to him or to his unit prior to the start of class and verify that he will or will not attend.

Most courses which have a classified segment of instruction are faced with the problem of having uncleared students arrive who expect to take the course. Common practice has been to turn them away at the door. This is wasteful of the time, expense and planning it took to get there.

Depending upon the course, there will be varying solutions to this problem. The bottom line is that once a student is turned away at the door to the schoolhouse, he just may never be available again. Backup POIs could be developed in virtually every subject to allow students to achieve at least some proficiency once they have gone to the expense of coming to the training site.

Develop Validation Processes at Schools Which Will Grant Constructive Training in RC MI Skills. From time to time and for various reasons (such as the preceding situation involving uncleared students in classified courses of

instruction) it may be necessary or advantageous for a soldier not to attend all phases of a particular course of instruction. Rather than the all-or-nothing approach, a sliding scale could be developed to grant credit for Army subcourses taken as well as for OJT and related formal civilian training. In the case of the uncleared student, partial MOSQ could be granted by the school after the student has completed the abbreviated POI. The local RTS-I could send an MTT to visit units on-site to validate this type of training.[33]

To illustrate the possible application of the concept, consider the MOS qualification of an intelligence analyst (MOS 96B10) who is assigned to a MID(S) doing research and analysis in the area of weapons systems. The unit is affiliated with a major aerospace industry under AR 140-1 and the soldier's civilian job is technical drafting of gun systems. The 96B10 enlisted MOS-producing course is conducted in two 2-week phases at four sites in the United States. In lieu of attending the formal 96B10 course, the soldier could attend the one week Soviet Small Arms Course taught at Aberdeen Proving Ground and the two-week Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analyst Introductory Course (STIAIC) taught by the Defense Intelligence College at his CAPSTONE headquarters. These three weeks of alternate course work are normally not sufficient to qualify

in an MOS; however, when they are evaluated in combination with satisfactory performance in the EM's civilian technical job and the mission of the unit, a strong case could be made that the soldier is truly MOS-qualified.[34]

In order to implement a training program with sufficient flexibility, more emphasis would have to be placed on personal attention to individual soldier needs. A cookie cutter approach will not suffice and should not be used as an excuse for poor management or leadership.

Re-look and Eliminate or Reduce Clearance Requirements for Linguist-Type MOS's. The immediate benefit is that it would allow more accessions into the RC from ethnic language qualified people. Unit SOP's could be implemented to avoid security compromises.

Virtually every service school and branch school trains uncleared foreign students with cleared U.S. students. Similar control procedures could be used in RC MI units to maintain security.

While it is beyond the scope of this study, it might be worthwhile to review how the United States Army was able to ramp up its ethnic linguist capabilities during World War II, Korea and the Vietnam war. In all these conflicts a significant capability was achieved using indigenous forces or other ethnic language-speaking people. Certainly if it

can be accomplished in warfare it could be done in the
relatively benign peacetime environment.

Be Innovative--Do not Mirror the Active Component. This
philosophy was clearly expressed in The Army Plan (TAP),[35]
by the U.S. Army Training board,[36] the Reserve Component
Training Strategy[37] and discussions with numerous field
grade and general grade officers in the course of preparing
this study. Turbulence, funding differences, geographic
dispersion, available training time and many other factors
mandate that the RC will train differently from the AC.
Many in the Army Reserve as well as the AC do not understand
this point. The AC does not train like the RC and for good
reasons. Likewise, the RC should not train like the AC.
The basic question to be answered when addressing training
is, "What course of action will best facilitate the unit (or
the individual) mission?"

ENDNOTES

14. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>RC Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP)</u>, p. 1-2 (hereafter referred to as "RC TDAP").

15. Abbreviations stand for: Major U.S. Army Reserve Command (MUSARC), Continental United States Army (CONUSA), and Forces Command (FORSCOM).

16. DA Cir 350-88-XX, p. 2-3.

17. Interviews with Donna Spiewak and Paul Yanis, U.S. Defense Investigative Service, Winooski, Vermont, Spring/Summer 1988.

18. Briefing papers from Training Division, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, May 1989.

19. Interview with James Heminway, COL, Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, 17 January 1990.

20. Interview with Harold Soyster, LTG, Defense Intelligence Agency, Carlisle, 15 December 1989. Cited with special permission of LTG Soyster.

21. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>United States Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic)(MID(S)) Umbrella Architecture Implementation Concept Plan.</u>

22. George J. Walker, BG, CINCFOR Joint Message, <u>FORSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic)(MID(S)) Capstone Assessment</u>, 2 February 1989.

23. Mark A.Coyle, MAJ, and Jerry Horvath, U.S. Department of the Army--Reserve Training, personal interviews, Arlington, 20 December 1989 and 17 January 1990.

24. Interview with James Vaitkunas, LTC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 18 January 1990.

25. Sam A. Gray, BG, Point Paper, Fort McPherson, 1989.

26. Mark Coyle, MAJ, Information Paper, Washington, 4 October 1989.

27. Edward D. Simms and Irv Greenberg, "Skill Training in the Reserve Components," in _Reserve Manpower, Personnel and Training Research_, ed. by H. Wallace Sinako and Kenneth J. Coffey, pp. 67-69.

28. Gray.

29. James Heminway, personal interview.

30. _RC TDAP_, p. 1-3.

31. AR 140-1, p. 32.

32. James Vaitkunas, personal interview.

33. James Vaitkunas, personal interview.

34. The situation in this example actually occurred in the 490th Military Intelligence Detachment in Winooski, Vermont. Because of restrictive regulations, however, the enlisted man involved spent several years of unpaid off-duty time getting MOS qualified by taking the 96B correspondence course.

35. U.S. Department of the Army, _The Army Plan_ (U), p. 17 (U).

36. U.S. Army Training Board, _Enhancing Reserve Component Unit Training_, p. i.

37. DA Circular 350-88-XX, p. 2-1.

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
"IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE TEMPEST, GET OUT OF THE TEAPOT."

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

RESERVES OR RESERVATIONS--WHO PAYS THE BILL?

While this study was being prepared, one interviewee looked at the list of recommendations in Chapter III and said, "You've got to identify the bill payer." His point is well taken. In a narrow sense, in a world constrained by funding-related acronyms like OMAR (Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve), OPTEMPO (Operating Tempo), REDCON (Readiness Condition) and the like, some of what has been discussed appears to have little practical applicability. Budget priorities cannot be shifted easily. From a macro perspective, however, the bill payer question becomes clearer.

The single issue most important to the Army in the second half of the twentieth century is the Total Army concept. The Army is people. The reserve components, which constitute well over 50% of the Army's strength and which have provided the majority of fighting forces throughout our nation's history, are at the center of the issue.

The United States today is coping with the twin whirlwinds of "glasnost" and "perestroika". Events have transpired at a rate no one would have believed a year ago. They will continue in the future at bewildering speed. The cold war is over and a new era is beginning.

As an army we should train against threat capabilities, not against threat intentions. Today the Soviet capability to wage war remains high. Tomorrow, that will not be so as CFE agreements and the economic conversion of Warsaw Pact nations provide a new focus. Until a new super-threat emerges, the role of a large standing United States Army will decline. The Army is facing a period of retrenchment until our national existence is again threatened by some currently undefined threat at some unknown future time.

The Army today is faced with two choices. It can resist cutbacks and attempt to hold the line with as large an Active Component as possible against a diminishing threat. Or, it can choose to invest a larger proportion of its assets into developing a surge capability to effectively mobilize against a future threat.

The first approach is virtually doomed to failure. Congress and public pressure will take matters into their own hands. We are already beginning to see this happen. Units will be drawn down arbitrarily. Equipment will be stockpiled to rust and disintegrate after a few years.[38]

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All that will remain will be a small fighting force--probably much smaller than that which is envisioned in today's planning. This force may or may not be effective in low intensity conflict but it will certainly be unable to project meaningful power in a major war. The capability for rapid buildup to truly effective fighting status will have been lost, ironically, by the very motivations which today are attempting to keep the AC as large as possible.

If this nation wishes to retain a capacity to fight a total war, the second course of action--investing in a surge capability--will be the only politically and economically viable option as this century draws to a close. It should be thought of as truly an investment and treated much like a family budget. One's limited money and resources has to be put where it will grow the best. The payoff will not come from near-term gratification. It will come from short term sacrifice for long term gain. The Army can attempt to choose to keep its Active Component strong at the expense of the Reserve structure for the next few years or it can choose to husband its resources and invest in the future.

The billpayer becomes obvious.[39] If we are to provide for a capability to fight a protracted war at the high end of the conflict spectrum, a greater investment in the capability of the RC is necessary. If this is not done and if this nation somehow manages to survive, some general in

the twenty-first century will almost certainly paraphrase

General Bradley's quote:

> "The American Army's long neglect of intelligence
> training was soon reflected by the ineptness of
> our initial undertakings....Had it not been for
> the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably
> filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout
> the war, the Army would have been pressed...."

38. Anyone who witnessed the dozens of acres of abandoned, stockpiled U.S. Army equipment in DaNang, South Vietnam in 1973 should be inclined to agree with this assessment.

39. Dr. Frederick C. Oelrich, a senior staff member with the Federal Emergency Management Agency writes, "The currently proposed reductions in Reserve Component strength, to preserve a small number of active spaces, is short sighted and will ultimately prove to decrease our national security posture." Frederick C. Oelrich, COL, "Mobilization Could be too Little, too Late Situation," ROA National Security Report, March, 1990, p. 12.

"SEE ANYONE YOU KNOW?"

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